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Summary
In the past decade, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has snuffed out
Belarus’s modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy and created
an authoritarian, Soviet-style regime.  Belarus held presidential elections in March
2006.   In a vote condemned by the U.S., EU and OSCE as falling well short of
international standards, Lukashenko won re-election by an overwhelming margin.
Belarus’s economy is the most unreformed in Europe, according to an assessment by
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
Of the republics of the former Soviet Union, Belarus has perhaps the closest
historical and cultural ties to Russia.  Efforts to establish a political and economic
“union” between the two countries have had substantial public support in Belarus.
Nevertheless, the pace of integration between Belarus and Russia remains slow, in
large part due to Lukashenko’s refusal to undertake economic reforms. Current
Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused less on forcing the pace of
integration efforts directed from the top, and more on gaining control of Belarus’s
economic assets (particularly oil and natural gas pipelines), while limiting the costs
of subsidizing the unreformed Belarusian economy.  Russia and Belarus have close
military ties.  Russian and Belarusian air defenses are closely integrated, and Russia
has supplied Belarus with its best air defense equipment.  A small number of Russian
troops remain in Belarus, in part to run a naval radio station and an early warning
radar station.  Russian strategic bombers are also stationed in Belarus, although
reportedly without nuclear weapons. 
U.S. officials have criticized Lukashenko as “Europe’s last dictator.”  They have
also expressed concerns about Belarus’s arms sales and other ties to rogue regimes,
such Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  The United States pursues a policy of “selective
engagement,” which limits ties to the regime, while providing modest support to pro-
democracy organizations in Belarus.  The United States and the European Union
have imposed sanctions on top Belarusian leaders.
Congress has responded to the situation in Belarus with legislation.  The Belarus
Democracy Act, signed by President Bush in October 2004 (P.L. 108-347),
authorizes aid for pro-democracy forces in Belarus and funding for increased
broadcasting to Belarus by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
The bill supports sanctions on Belarus and top leaders of the Lukashenko regime
until Belarus meets specific democratic and human rights criteria.  The bill also
requires the President to report within 90 days and every year thereafter on the sale
by Belarus of weapons or weapons-related assistance to regimes supporting
terrorism, and on the personal wealth of Lukashenko and other senior Belarusian
leaders.   The 109th Congress has passed several resolutions criticizing human rights
abuses and calling on Belarus to hold free and fair elections.
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Belarus: Background and 
U.S. Policy Concerns
Introduction
In the past decade, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has snuffed out
Belarus’s modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy and created
an authoritarian regime.  His regime, in rhetoric and policies a throwback to the
Soviet era, is increasingly an anachronism located among a Central Europe integrated
into Euro-Atlantic institutions, a Ukraine that made strides in democratization, and
a Russia that is increasingly authoritarian but moving forward with economic
modernization.  Those advocating a stronger U.S. role in trying to bring democratic
change to Belarus say that the country is important to the United States because, as
what U.S. officials have called “Europe’s last dictatorship,” Belarus is an obstacle
to the U.S. goal of making Europe “whole and free.”  Another concern is Belarus’s
support for pariah regimes, in particular through arms sales.
Political and Economic Situation
Lukashenko dominates the Belarusian political scene, controlling the
parliament, government, security services, and judiciary through a large presidential
administration and substantial extra-budgetary resources.  He has reduced potential
threats from within his regime by frequently removing or transferring officials at all
levels, often claiming they are incompetent or corrupt.  Former regime figures who
move into opposition are singled out for particularly harsh punishment.  His tight
control over an unreformed economy has prevented the rise of powerful “oligarchs,”
as has occurred in Ukraine and Russia.  The Lukashenko regime also controls almost
all of the media, which it uses to burnish Lukashenko’s image and attack real and
imagined adversaries.  Lukashenko is known for his political unpredictability and for
making rambling and  rhetorically colorful public statements.1 
Lukashenko was elected as President of Belarus in 1994 on a populist, anti-
corruption platform.  He called a referendum in 1996 to approve a new constitution
to dramatically increase his powers and weaken those of the legislature and judiciary
and extend his term until 2001. The proposal was approved by an overwhelming
majority.  Lukashenko won re-election in September 2001.  Observers from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) condemned the 1996
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referendum and 2001 vote as not free and fair.  Belarus held parliamentary elections
in 2000 that were also condemned by international observers as not free and fair. 
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights for 2005 judged
Belarus’s human rights record to be “very poor.”  It says the government has
harassed, arrested, and beaten opposition figures.  The regime has forced the closure
of independent media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with
political issues and human rights, pushing these sectors to the brink of extinction.
The regime sharply restricts activities of independent trade unions and some religious
groups.  
A continuing human rights issue in Belarus has been the disappearances of
former parliament chairman Viktor Gonchar, his associate Anatoly Krasovsky,
former Interior Minister Yuri Zakharenko, and Russian television cameraman
Dimitry Zavadsky in 1999. All had been involved in opposition activities or criticized
the Lukashenko regime. U.S. officials have demanded that the Belarusian
government bring to justice all those involved in the disappearances.  In March 2002,
the regime convicted four Interior Ministry soldiers for the murder of Zavadsky. The
2005 State Department human rights report said that the government did not make
a “serious effort” to investigate the cases.  Indeed, the report noted that Lukashenko
gave a medal to an official named in a report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe (PACE) as a key figure in the crimes. 
Belarus held parliamentary elections on October 17, 2004. An OSCE
observation mission found the election to fall well short of international standards.
Government-supported candidates won all 110 seats in the lower house of the
parliament.  Simultaneously with the parliamentary vote, Lukashenko held a
referendum on lifting the two-term limit for the Presidency in the Belarusian
constitution.  In order for the referendum to be approved, at least half of all registered
voters has to vote in favor.  Belarusian election officials claimed that 77% of all
registered voters approved the referendum, with turnout of 89%.  The approval of the
referendum question cleared the way for Lukashenko to run for a third term as
President in 2006.
On March 19, 2006, Belarus held presidential elections.  According to monitors
from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the elections
failed to meet OSCE standards for free and fair elections. The observers noted many
serious shortcomings in the elections, including harassment, arrests, and police
violence against opposition campaign workers, including the beating and arrest of
presidential candidate Aleksandr Kazulin on March 2.  (Kazulin was later sentenced
to five and a half years in prison for “hooliganism” and disorderly conduct, charges
U.S. and European officials denounced as politically motivated.)   
The observers also noted that the largely government-controlled media was
heavily biased against opposition candidates; domestic election observers were
arrested; and almost no opposition figures were included in the administration of the
elections, resulting in a vote count that was not “transparent.”  The observers said
that the KGB (Belarus’s security service) issued statements just before the vote
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associating opposition and civil society groups with terrorism and charged that they
were plotting a violent uprising.2
Belarusian election officials announced that Lukashenko had won the election,
with over 82% of the vote.  His closest opponent, opposition leader Aleksandr
Milinkevich, won only 6%.  Milinkevich and other opposition candidates denounced
the vote as fraudulent and called for massive demonstrations to force the authorities
to hold a new, free, and fair election.  More than 10,000 persons attended the first
demonstrations in the capital, Minsk.  The size of the protests soon dwindled,
however.  The regime refrained from a massive, violent crackdown on the
demonstrators, but scores of persons were arrested, including opposition campaign
leaders.  Russian officials praised the conduct of the election and congratulated
Lukashenko on his victory.
Economic Situation
Belarus’s economy is the most unreformed in Europe, according to most
observers.  Very little progress has been made toward privatization of state-owned
firms or collective farms.  However, Belarus’s economy appears to be doing quite
well, at least on paper.  Belarus’s Gross Domestic Product grew by a reported 10.9%
in the first quarter of 2006, on a year-on-year basis.  Despite loose monetary policies,
Belarus has avoided the hyperinflation it suffered during the 1990s.  Inflation in April
2006 was 7.3%, on a year-on-year basis.  The official unemployment rate is 1.7%,
although experts believe the real figure is substantially higher, because the very low
amounts offered as unemployment compensation mean that few Belarusians bother
to register for benefits.  Real wages increased by 22.2% in March 2006, year-on-year.
There are several explanations for Belarus’s apparent economic success.
Belarus’s economy is buoyed by exports to a growing Russia, and Belarusian
refineries are profiting from high energy prices to export refined Russian crude oil
to Western countries.  In addition, many experts doubt that Belarusian statistics are
entirely accurate.  Production figures may be exaggerated by officials to avoid
punishment by Lukashenko for not meeting planned targets.  Growth in industrial
production is made possible by subsidies to ailing state firms.  Wage increases are
mandated by the government.  Collective farms are also propped up by subsidies,
although private plots held by peasants are more productive.   
Lukashenko’s policies have provided a low but stable standard of living for
many Belarusians and are a key reason for the public support that he enjoys,
particularly among older and rurally based Belarusians.  However, it is unclear how




Belarus has close historical and cultural ties with Russia.  Efforts to establish
a political and economic “union” between the two countries have had substantial
public support in Belarus.  However, the pace of integration between Belarus and
Russia remains slow.  During the 1990s, Russia and Belarus adopted a large number
of documents on the establishment of  political and economic “union” between the
two countries, most of which remain unimplemented.  Putin has been openly
contemptuous of Lukashenko’s grandiose rhetoric about integration.   Lukashenko
has apparently also feared that Russia would try to replace him with a more pliable
figure.   Lukashenko has at times restricted retransmission in Belarus of largely state-
controlled Russian television, which sometimes has carried stories critical of
Lukashenko.  Lukashenko has also harassed opposition figures reportedly linked to
Moscow and has replaced senior intelligence officials having especially close ties
with their Russian counterparts with staunch loyalists.  However, after democratic
revolutions in Ukraine and Kirghizstan in 2005, Moscow appears to have decided
that, despite his failings, Lukashenko is Russia’s most dependable ally among the
former Soviet countries; Moscow may, therefore, refrain from undermining him.
Efforts to move forward on economic union, although given strong rhetorical
support by Lukashenko, have been stymied by Belarus’s reluctance to cede control
of monetary policy to Moscow as a condition for a currency union, which would
involve the adoption of the Russian ruble by Belarus.  As a result, Russia has
repeatedly postponed setting a date for a joint currency for the two countries. 
Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused less on forcing the pace of
integration efforts directed from the top, and more on gaining control of Belarus’s
economic assets, while limiting the cost of subsidizing the unreformed Belarusian
economy. For his part, Lukashenko has attempted to prevent Russia’s takeover of key
Belarusian firms.  
An illustrative example of the Russian-Belarus economic relationship has been
Belarus’s dependence on cheap Russian natural gas and the battle for control of oil
and natural gas pipelines in Belarus.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s
state-owned natural gas firm Gazprom has supplied Belarus with natural gas at
Russian domestic prices, providing a large indirect subsidy to the Lukashenko
regime.  However, Gazprom has strongly pressured Belarus to sell to it control of the
Beltransgaz natural gas firm (which controls the pipelines and other infrastructure on
Belarusian territory) and other key Belarusian energy firms, or face the quadrupling
of the price Belarus would pay for Russian natural gas.  Experts believe such an
increase would devastate Belarus’s economy and could jeopardize Lukashenko’s
power.  Belarus has agreed in principle to sell Beltransgaz, but the two sides are
bargaining over its valuation.
Russia and Belarus have close military ties.  Russian and Belarusian air defenses
are closely integrated, and Russia has supplied Belarus with its best air defense
equipment.  Although they do not have joint armed forces, a regional task force of
Belarusian and Russian ground forces conducts joint military exercises.   A small
number of Russian troops remain in Belarus, in part to run a naval radio station and
an early warning radar station. 
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NATO, the European Union, and Belarus
Belarus’s relations with NATO are poor. Belarus strongly opposed NATO
enlargement, often with more bitterness than Russia did.  In 2004, after the second
wave of enlargement, Lukashenko continued to say that NATO represents a military
threat to Belarus. Belarus is a member of the Partnership for Peace program, but has
not been very active in it.  
Belarus’s ties with the European Union have also been difficult.  Although
Lukashenko has often called for closer economic ties with the EU, he has condemned
EU criticisms of his regime as interference in the country’s affairs.  Since 1997, the
EU has followed a policy of limiting its official contacts with the Lukashenko
regime.  Belarus is the only ex-Soviet country without a Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) with the EU in force.   Because of this, Belarus is excluded from
the EU’s “European Neighborhood” policy, which seeks to improve ties with
countries around the EU.  The strategy includes “action plans” for Ukraine, Moldova
and countries in the Middle East and North Africa, but not Belarus.4  The EU has
budgeted 10 million Euros in aid to Belarus’s population under the TACIS program
for 2005-2006.  The aid will assist NGOs, as well as efforts in such areas as health,
the environment, and the regions affected by the Chernobyl nuclear accident.   In
January 2006, the EU started a modest program to beam independent information via
radio and television into Belarus from Poland, Lithuania, and Russia.
On August 6, 2004,  the EU announced that it had agreed that Yuri Sivakov, the
Minister of Sport of Belarus should be barred from entering Greece to attend the
Olympic Games in Athens.  The statement noted that Sivakov, formerly Interior
Minister of Belarus, had been identified as one of the key figures in the 1999
disappearances of Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenko, and
Dimitry Zavadsky, in an April 2004 Council of Europe report. After the
announcement, Sivakov announced that he would not attend the Games.  Belarusian
officials angrily denounced the EU move.
In September 2004, the EU barred from its territory high officials involved in
the murder of the four murdered and disappeared journalists and politicians, as well
as those involved in subsequent cover-ups.  In December 2004 elections, the EU
announced an extension of its visa ban to “persons who are directly responsible for
the fraudulent elections and referendum in Belarus on October 17, 2004 and those
who are responsible for severe human rights violations in the repression of peaceful
demonstrators in the aftermath of the elections and referendum in Belarus.”5 After
the March 2006 presidential elections, the EU imposed a visa ban and an asset freeze
on more than 30 high-ranking Belarusian officials, including Lukashenko, key
members of the Belarusian presidential administration, parliament, law enforcement
ministries, and election authorities.
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However, the EU has not so far not supported economic sanctions on Belarus
as a whole.  Indeed, Belarus currently enjoys EU tariff reductions under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), although these are currently under
investigation by the EU due to Lukashenko’s repression of independent trade unions.
The EU also maintains contacts with mid-level and local Belarusian officials in order
to ease the country’s isolation.
Some analysts have asserted that some EU countries are reluctant to take
tougher actions against Lukashenko for fear of antagonizing Russia or provoking
Luskashenko to cause trouble on the lengthy EU-Belarus border.  Belarus could make
the situation uncomfortable for Poland by allowing more human trafficking to occur
through Belarus to Poland or by creating obstacles for goods transiting Belarus to or
from Poland.  Belarusian border guards have reportedly seized and confiscated cargos
in the past, often with dubious legal justification.6  
A significant factor in EU policy is the long-standing historical relationship
between Belarus and neighboring EU states, especially Poland.  Belarus has a
significant Polish ethnic minority.  Polish-Belarusian ties have deteriorated in the
past year due to Lukashenko’s efforts to exert more control over ethnic Polish
organizations in Belarus.   Poland and the Baltic states have worked closely with
Belarus’s pro-democracy media, labor unions and political parties, including by
sponsoring international conferences on Belarus. They have pressed for more EU and
U.S. engagement in bringing democracy to Belarus.  Polish officials have spoken in
favor of eventual EU membership for a reformed Belarus, albeit in the “very long
term.”7 
U.S. Policy
The United States recognized independent Belarus on December 25, 1991. U.S.
officials hailed the removal of all nuclear weapons from Belarus in November 1996.
However, U.S.-Belarus relations deteriorated as Lukashenko become increasingly
authoritarian. In March 1997, a State Department spokesman announced a policy of
“selective engagement” with Belarus on issues of U.S. national interests and “very
limited dealings” on other issues.  
U.S. aid to Belarus has been meager in recent years, reflecting the selective
engagement strategy.  The United States provided $11.9 million in bilateral aid to
Belarus in FY2005, focused mainly on supporting pro-democracy NGOs and
independent media, fighting HIV/AIDS (a serious problem in Belarus) and trafficking
in persons, and bolstering Belarusian border guards’ ability to detect weapons of
mass destruction. The Administration estimates the United States will provide $12.1
million in aid in FY2006 and requested $10.2 million for FY2007.  The
Administration notes that the regime’s increased harassment of NGOs, including by
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banning foreign aid to NGOs even remotely dealing with politics and jailing
members of NGOs not registered with the authorities, makes the  delivery of U.S. aid
difficult.8 
The United States has been strongly critical of Belarus’s failures in democratic
development and human rights.  After Lukashenko’s victory in the September 2001
presidential election, the Administration sharply criticized Lukashenko, charging that
he had “stolen” the election and calling him “Europe’s last dictator.”9 U.S. officials
have demanded that the Belarusian government bring to justice all those involved in
the disappearances of the four members of the opposition in 1999.  In November
2002, the United States announced that it would join 14 EU countries in imposing
a visa ban against Lukashenko and other top Belarusian officials due to Belarus’s
closure of an OSCE human rights monitoring mission in the country.  The visa ban
was lifted in April 2003 after the OSCE office was reopened. 
In addition to U.S. opposition to Lukashenko’s domestic policy, the United
States has criticized Belarus’s relations with rogue regimes.  In April 2003, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Pifer charged that substantial evidence existed
that Belarus had provided weapons and training to countries and groups that support
terrorism, including Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.10 Belarus’s assistance to
Saddam’s regime may have also extended beyond the regime’s collapse.  One high-
ranking aide to Saddam was reportedly captured by U.S. forces with Belarusian
passports for himself and other key regime leaders, including Saddam’s sons.11
On October 20, 2004, in a statement announcing his signing of the Belarus
Democracy Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-347), President Bush said the October 17
Belarusian elections were undertaken “in a climate of abuse and fear,” noting that
OSCE and other observers found that Lukashenko’s victory “was achieved by
fraudulent means.”  He added that “at a time when freedom is advancing around the
world... there is no place in a Europe whole and free for a regime of this kind.”  The
President stressed that “the fate of Belarus will rest not with a dictator, but with the
students, trade unionists, civic and religious leaders, journalists, and all citizens of
Belarus claiming freedom for their nation.”  In December 2004, the United States,
in concert with the EU, enacted a visa ban on Belarusian officials involved in
electoral fraud and human rights violations.  A March 2006 Administration report,
required by Congress as part of the Belarus Democracy Act, accused Lukashenko and
his regime of corruption on a massive scale and selling arms to state supporters of
terrorism such as Iran and Sudan. 
U.S. officials were sharply critical of the conduct of the Belarus presidential
election.  On March 20, 2006, a White House spokesman said that the United States
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“does not accept the results of the election,” saying that it was conducted in a
“climate of fear” and adding that the U.S. supported opposition calls for a new vote
to be held. In May 2006, at a meeting of post-communist nations in Lithuania, Vice
President Dick Cheney called Belarus “the last dictatorship in Europe,” echoing
similar statements made by Administration officials in the past.  Cheney noted that
“peaceful demonstrators have been beaten, dissidents vanished, and a climate of fear
prevails under a government that subverts free elections.  There is no place in a
Europe whole and free for a regime of this kind.”12 
The United States imposed sanctions on key members of the Lukashenko regime
after the 2006 Belarusian presidential elections.  On May 15, 2006, President Bush
announced a visa ban for the travel of senior Belarusian leaders to the United States.
On June 19, 2006, the United States froze the assets of these officials.  In addition to
Lukashenko himself, the measures affect such persons as Lukashenko’s closest
advisors, the head of the Belarusian KGB, the Ministers of Justice and Interior, the
head of the Belarusian state television and radio company, and the head of the central
election commission.  In a message to Congress, the President said that these persons
were chosen because they undermined democratic processes in Belarus, violated
human rights of Belarusians, or engaged in corruption.13  
The United States is also concerned about human trafficking in Belarus.
According to the State Department’s 2006 Trafficking in Persons report, Belarus is
a country of origin and transit for women and children trafficked for sexual
exploitation.  It is listed as a “Tier 2” country.  This means that it does not meet
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making “significant”
efforts to do so. The report says Belarus has demonstrated “political will” to fight
trafficking, but needs to do more in the protection and assistance to victims.
Belarus’s record has improved in recent years.   In the 2002 report, Belarus was listed
as a “Tier 3” country, that is, one not meeting minimum standards for ending
trafficking and not making significant efforts to do so.  Such countries may be subject
to U.S. sanctions under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (P.L. 106-386).    
Congressional Action
Members of Congress have spoken out strongly against human rights abuses in
Belarus in Congressional hearings, floor statements, speeches and proposed
legislation.  In the first session of the 108th Congress, the Belarus Democracy Act was
introduced.  On February 25, 2004, the House International Relations Committee
unanimously approved a modified version of the bill.  It authorizes aid for pro-
democracy forces in Belarus,  as well as funds for increased broadcasting to Belarus
by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.  The bill calls for
sanctions on Belarus, including expressing the sense of the Congress in favor of a
visa ban against senior Belarusian officials; a prohibition on strategic exports to
Belarus; a prohibition on U.S. financial assistance to the Belarusian government; and
expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States should oppose
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multilateral financial aid to Belarus.  These conditions would remain in place until
Belarus meets specific democratic and human rights criteria.  The President can
waive the sanctions if he certifies that it is in the U.S. “national interest” to do so.
The bill expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should coordinate with
European countries to take similar measures against Belarus.
The bill also requires the President to report within 90 days and every year
thereafter on the sale of weapons or weapons-related assistance to regimes supporting
terrorism, and on the personal wealth of Lukashenko and other senior Belarusian
leaders.  While supporting the bill’s objectives, the Administration opposed
mandated sanctions included in previous versions of the bill, saying they would
reduce needed diplomatic flexibility.14  The President signed the modified Belarus
Democracy Act on October 20, 2004 (P.L. 108-347). On July 22, 2004, the House
passed H.Res. 652 by a vote of 421-0.  The resolution called on Belarus to hold free
and fair parliamentary elections. 
 Before the Belarusian presidential election, the House and Senate each passed
resolutions in March 2006 calling on Belarus to hold a free and fair vote.  The House
resolution (H.Res. 673) listed the shortcomings of the election campaign, called for
specific improvements before the vote, and held out the possibility of better relations
between Belarus and the United States if the election were free and fair.  The Senate
resolution (S.Res. 401) contains similar provisions but adopts a more critical tone,
sharply condemning the “tyranny” of the Lukashenko regime.  S.Res. 530, which
dealt with U.S.-Russian relations on the eve of the G-8 summit in Moscow, criticized
Russia for being the only G-8 country to applaud the outcome of the Belarusian
presidential election.
On July 27, 2006, Representative Christopher Smith introduced the Belarus
Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2006 (H.R. 5948).  The bill contains many of the
same provisions as the 2004 law, such as authorizing U.S. aid for pro-democracy
groups, banning U.S. aid to the Belarusian government, supporting U.S. broadcasting
to Belarus, and proposing sanctions against high-level Belarusian officials.
Policy Options
Many policy options have been proposed to deal with the problems posed by the
Lukashenko regime.  These options are not mutually exclusive and may be used in
combination.  Unilateral U.S. action, while it may put some pressure on the regime,
could be less effective than actions supported by the European Union and, if possible,
Russia, due to the greater economic and other links they have with Belarus.
! One approach would be to bolster the Belarusian opposition.  The
United States and its allies could increase aid to Belarusian
independent media and non-governmental organizations from
current, modest levels.  However, the regime appears to be stepping
up repression.  There may also be a limit to how much additional aid
the relatively weak, oppressed, and internally divided opposition to
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Lukashenko’s regime can absorb.  Moreover, Lukashenko has taken
every opportunity to paint pro-democracy groups as taking orders
from foreign powers because of the aid they receive and has barred
foreign aid to such NGOs.  
! One could try to ease the isolation of the Belarusian population by
expanding exchange programs to permit more Belarusians to be
exposed to changes taking place in neighboring Poland and the
Baltic states. However, the regime has taken steps to restrict foreign
travel for Belarusians. The United States and the EU could also
expand broadcasts from neighboring countries to break the regime’s
media monopoly.  
  
! Another possible course of action would be to impose additional
sanctions on Belarus or the Lukashenko regime.   The United States
and the EU have imposed a visa ban on top Belarusian leaders.
However it is unclear whether increased sanctions against the
leadership would have any effect, other than causing it to dig in its
heels.  Sanctions against Belarus as a whole could cause hardship to
ordinary Belarusians.
! The United States could also try to enlist the assistance of Russia,
arguing that Russia would be better off with a democratic, market-
oriented Belarus than a sometimes unpredictable dictatorship.
Russia’s support, overt or tacit, would be very valuable, given
Belarus’s economic and psychological dependence on Russia.
However, as noted above, Russian policy under Putin has focused on
gaining control of Belarus’s key economic assets, not in ousting
Lukashenko. Moreover, while Russia has urged Belarus to undertake
economic reforms, it may be less eager to promote democracy there,
particularly at a time when Russia itself appears to be moving
toward authoritarianism.  In addition,  Russia has tended to view
Belarus as lying within its own sphere of interests, in which it would
prefer to act without Western interference.
! The United States could attempt to re-engage with the Lukashenko
regime as a way to encourage it to move toward a democratic course.
This option has generated very little if any support, mainly due to the
belief among many observers that Lukashenko is firmly committed
to his present course, and therefore that true change can only come
after Lukashenko is gone.
